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“I Will Be with Them”: God at the Burning Bush 
as an Ideal of Compassion for All Creatures
Geoffrey D. Claussen
I imagine God not as a person, being, or force, but as the ideal of 
moral goodness that commands all human beings, an ideal toward 
which all of us should strive as best we are able.1 As I think that the 
virtue of compassion for all sentient beings is a virtue that is central 
to morality, I think that it is valuable to conceive of God as the ideal 
of compassion for all sentient beings. One of the ancient Jewish 
texts that helps me to conceive of God in this way is the narrative 
of Moses’ encounter with God at the burning bush, as related in 
the third chapter of the biblical book of Exodus and in a number of 
classical midrashic texts. In this episode, we may find a focal point for 
our meditations on the Divine, a way to imagine God encountered as 
a commanding ideal of compassion for all sentient beings.
The Compassion of God and the Compassion of Moses
The third chapter of Exodus unfolds while Pharaoh, king of Egypt, 
has enslaved the people of Israel and is demanding the death of all 
male children. After seeing the suffering of his people and killing 
an Egyptian taskmaster, Moses has fled to Midian, where he has 
intervened to defend Zipporah and her sisters. He has married 
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Zipporah and become a shepherd, tending the flocks of his Midianite 
father-in-law Jethro. Meanwhile, the text tells us that God has taken 
notice of the Israelites’ suffering, whereupon God appears to Moses:
Now Moses, tending the flock of his father-in-law Jethro, 
the priest of Midian, drove the flock into the wilderness, 
and came to Horeb, the mountain of God. An angel of the 
Eternal One appeared to him in a blazing fire out of a bush. 
He gazed, and there was a bush all aflame, yet the bush was 
not consumed. Moses said, “I must turn aside to look at this 
marvelous sight; why doesn’t the bush burn up?” When the 
Eternal One saw that he had turned aside to look, God called 
to him out of the bush: “Moses! Moses!” He answered, “Here 
I am.”2 (Exodus 3:1–4)
As the narrative unfolds, God then goes on to self-identify, using the 
enigmatic name Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh—“I will be as I will be,” as it 
might be translated—and to commission Moses to free the suffering 
Israelites from Egypt.
Why does God choose Moses at this moment, while Moses 
is shepherding his father-in-law’s flock? One midrash (found in 
Shemot Rabbah) offers an answer that I find particularly suggestive:
The blessed Holy One only tested Moses by the flock. Our 
rabbis have said that when Moses our rabbi, peace be upon 
him, was shepherding the flock of Jethro in the wilderness, 
a kid escaped. He ran after it until he reached a shady place. 
When he reached the shady place, he happened upon a pool 
of water where the kid was standing, drinking. When Moses 
reached [the kid], he said: “I had not known that you had run 
away because of thirst. You must be tired.” He placed it on his 
shoulder and walked back. The blessed Holy One said: “You 
have shown compassion in guiding a flock belonging to a 
mortal; so, by your life, you should shepherd My flock, Israel.”3
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In this midrash, God characterizes Moses as acting with exemplary 
compassion. Moses, to his credit, does not rebuke the kid for escaping 
from the flock. Instead, he admits that he had not understood what it 
needed and shows the empathy required to understand what it must 
be feeling; he responds with an action that offers relief to the kid. 
God appears to Moses and charges him with his mission precisely 
because of this display of compassion to the kid. The burning bush 
appears where it appears—at the “mountain of God,” Mount Horeb 
(also called Mount Sinai, as I will discuss below)—precisely because 
its location has been sanctified by Moses’ compassion.
One interpretation of the midrash is that in this moment Moses 
reveals not only his compassion for the particular kid but also his 
compassion for all sentient beings. We find interpretations along 
these lines, for example, within the Musar movement, a nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century Jewish movement focused on the 
cultivation of character, whose leaders gave considerable attention 
to the virtues of compassionate love for all creatures.4 The writings 
of Rabbi Natan (Nosson) Tzvi Finkel of Slobodka (1849 1927) offer 
a particularly clear explanation of how Moses’ concern for the kid 
revealed his capacity to understand what all creatures need: “Our 
rabbi Moses, who followed the kid so that he could figure out why it 
ran away, after he found that it was tired and thirsty had compassion 
for it and placed it on his shoulder—and so it was revealed that he 
was understanding and discerning of the needs of every creature. 
And so the blessed Holy One found him fit to be the shepherd of 
Israel.”5
Finkel explains that Moses’ compassion thus came to resemble 
the divine ideal of compassion for all creatures, as suggested by a 
verse from Psalm 145: “The eyes of all look to You, and You give 
them their nourishment promptly” (Psalm 145:15). It follows, Finkel 
writes, that God “is concerned for each [creature] in its own right, 
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in accordance with its needs, promptly. Therefore, only a person who 
follows in the ways of God and who also has compassion for all 
creatures, and who knows how to determine and think deeply about 
the needs of each and every one of them, passes the test and is fit for 
the position of being a shepherd and leader.”6 Moses passes the test 
because he shows his capacity to be concerned for each and every 
creature in line with the divine ideal of compassion.
From Finkel’s perspective, God decides to appear in the burning 
bush and charges Moses with his mission, because at this moment 
God sees how Moses can bring divine compassion into the world 
more deeply. For those of us who see God as the ultimate moral 
ideal itself, rather than as a decision-making Being, we may build 
on Finkel’s understanding in a somewhat different way. Moses, we 
might say, achieves a closeness to the divine ideal of compassion 
for all creatures, an ideal that commands him to take up further 
responsibilities and to seek the ideal even more deeply.
We might consider that while an ultimate moral ideal is not a 
conscious being, it does direct us, make demands of us, obligate us, 
and command us. As many moral traditions have argued, when we 
recognize a moral ideal, we are called to live up to that ideal to the 
extent that we are able.7 All of us are obligated to turn toward the 
ideal, to seek to grow in virtue, and to take steps toward the Good—
that is, in my language: toward God.
I imagine the story of Moses and his calling in this way. The 
suffering kid is a revelation that demands Moses’ response, and as 
Moses acts with newfound compassion, he grows even more in 
compassion. As he realizes his capacity for greater compassion, he 
realizes how much further he could grow as he recognizes the broader 
ideal of compassion for all creatures—for each creature in its own 
right, in accordance with its needs. He understands that he is called 
toward that ideal—that this ideal obligates him, commands him, and 
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demands his further action. This ideal of compassion burns within him 
and burns before his eyes, like a burning bush from which one cannot 
turn aside. The obligation to care for each and every creature rings 
in his ears and calls to him, as with a voice that cannot be silenced. 
Moses turns toward the ideal of compassion and the obligation that 
addresses him as if by his own name. He answers: “Here I am.”
The Burning Bush and the Revelation of God’s Name
The idea that the burning bush is a manifestation of divine 
compassion is prominent in rabbinic literature. One midrash (from 
Shemot Rabbah) sees a verse from Isaiah, “In all their affliction 
[God] was afflicted” (63:9), as alluding to God’s suffering amidst the 
thorns of the burning thorn bush, and explains: “The blessed Holy 
One said to Moses, ‘If you do not sense that I am suffering just as 
Israel is suffering, then you should know that I am speaking to you 
from within the thorns, [thus showing that it is] as if I am a partner 
in their suffering.”8 The burning bush is a thorn bush that shows 
how God compassionately joins the people of Israel while they 
suffer in Egypt. Another midrash (also from Shemot Rabbah) sees 
God’s concern expressed in the love language of the Song of Songs, 
interpreting its language to show God’s empathic relationship with 
Israel, as when Song of Songs 6:9 is interpreted as though it were 
speaking of God’s love not for “my perfect one” (tammati) but for 
“my twin” (te’omati): “Rabbi Yannai said: ‘Just as with twins, if one 
has a headache the other feels it also, so too the blessed Holy One 
says, as it were, ‘I am with [Israel] in [Israel’s] affliction.’”9 God is 
so closely attached to Israel that God feels Israel’s pain deeply, and 
God’s pain is made manifest with the burning bush. The burning 
bush is a revelation of pain and suffering that demands compassion.
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With these readings in mind, God’s declaration from the bush that 
God should be known as Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh, “I will be as I will be,” 
may be understood as also alluding to God’s compassionate suffering 
alongside Israel. One midrash (in the Tanḥuma) teaches this in the 
name of Rabbi Yaakov ben Rabbi Avina, who taught it in the name of 
Rabbi Huna of Tzippori, understanding that the repetition of ehyeh, 
“I will be,” alludes to God’s presence both amidst current suffering 
and future suffering: “I will be with them in this enslavement, and 
I will be with them in their continuing enslavement.”10 God, who 
promises in Exodus 3:12 to be with Moses (“I will be with you”), 
is now (in Exodus 3:14) promising to be with the entire people of 
Israel as they suffer (“I will be with them”). Those included within 
the circle of divine compassion include the entire people, and Moses 
cannot separate himself from the people’s suffering or from God’s 
suffering alongside them. Rather, he is called upon to emulate God’s 
compassion and to also experience the people’s suffering himself—
and precisely so as to be able to respond that “he will be with them” 
in their suffering, just as God is with them in their suffering. The 
revelation of the burning bush calls Moses to feel the suffering of 
Israel, to be a partner in their suffering, and to take responsibility 
to alleviate their suffering—to “free My people, the Israelites, from 
Egypt” (Exodus 3:10)11 as God instructs him.
Moses may well have the instinct to turn away from the visions of 
suffering that appear before his eyes, and to avoid the consequences of 
the revelation of divine compassion that he hears. He famously resists 
God’s call, beginning in Exodus 3:11: “Who am I, that I should go 
to Pharaoh and free the Israelites from Egypt?” But something has 
drawn him to the bush, and if we follow the midrashic traditions 
discussed here, it is not merely the miraculous sight. Moses is drawn 
to the expressions of suffering that are deeply painful to behold, 
revelations of suffering that have something in common with the 
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suffering of the thirsty and tired kid who has brought Moses to this 
spot but that are far more painful—revelations of the continued 
drowning of children, the beating of slaves, and the cries of the 
oppressed. We might imagine that Moses sees not only thorns and 
fire that represent suffering, but that he in fact sees the images of 
what that suffering looks like, and that he hears not only the voice 
of God but also the cries of those for whom God is present. It might 
well be tempting to turn away from such scenes and even from the 
thorns and fire that represent suffering, but the text emphasizes that 
Moses feels that he “must turn aside” toward the bush (Exodus 3:3), 
and God takes note of this turning toward suffering: “the Eternal 
One saw that he had turned aside to look” (Exodus 3:4). Whatever 
resistance Moses has regarding his mission, he does seek to approach 
the divine compassion that he hears, and he does eventually commit 
to taking responsibility to alleviate the suffering of Israel.
If we think of God as an ideal of compassion, these traditions may 
deepen our sense of that ideal. The midrashim cited here suggest to us 
that compassion involves being a partner in the suffering of others, 
even feeling the painful thorns that others feel, and committing to 
being with those who suffer. We can imagine Moses, as he takes on 
his mission before the burning bush, moving more closely to this 
ideal and realizing that compassion for all must include awareness 
of and responsiveness to even the most horrible atrocities. We can 
imagine Moses realizing just how much the ideal of compassion 
obligates him and committing to greater and greater responsibility.
Human and Animal Suffering, Intertwined
But what about the kid, whom Moses is perhaps still carrying on his 
shoulder? As Moses turns his attention to the grave suffering of the 
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people of Israel, does his experience with the non-human animal who 
brought him to Mount Horeb also remain in his heart and mind? Has 
he promised to still be with the tired kid, and does he still continue 
to hold the kid with compassion while he learns about the suffering 
of his people in Egypt? Does he continue to demonstrate that he is 
“understanding and discerning of the needs of every creature,” as he 
demonstrated in that encounter?
There is little in the continuing biblical narrative or in ancient 
midrashic tradition to show that this encounter or broader concern 
about the needs of every creature continue to be at the forefront of 
Moses’ consciousness. But it is worth noting that the ancient rabbis 
imagined Moses continuing to see traces of animal suffering—more 
severe suffering than the suffering of the kid—when he looked into 
the burning bush. A number of midrashic texts describe the burning 
bush as the sort of thorn bush that would trap helpless birds within it 
and tear them apart if they tried to escape, just as Israel was trapped 
within Egypt. In one midrash, Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai puts it in the 
following terms: “Just as this bush was the thorniest of all the trees 
in the world, in that any bird that entered into it could not manage 
to exit without tearing itself limb from limb, likewise was the slavery 
of Israel in Egypt the most oppressive slavery in the world.”12 The 
simile focuses attention on the suffering of human beings, but it also 
requires considering an image of the suffering of non-human animals. 
We can imagine that Moses continues to keep animal suffering in 
mind, or perhaps that the divine ideal keeps animal suffering before 
Moses’ eyes. Moses might be asked to expand his concern further 
here, primarily for the people of Israel, but also for other forms of 
animal suffering: the suffering before Moses’ mind now includes not 
only the kid that escapes to seek water but also the birds that want 
to escape a painful imprisonment but would be torn apart if they did 
249         “I Will Be with Them”
so. Concern for animal suffering and human suffering are here by no 
means mutually exclusive: rather, considering an image of suffering 
birds will help to deepen compassion for suffering humans.
The burning image of divine compassion that Moses is 
encountering here would seem to bring human suffering and animal 
suffering close together. The ideal of divine compassion is manifest 
in a thorn bush, allowing Moses to see the analogy between the 
suffering of Israel and the suffering of birds amidst thorns. The ideal 
of divine compassion has been manifest in response to a tired kid, 
and Moses learns about the trials of Israel while he feels the weight 
of that kid on his shoulders. The compassion that Moses discovers 
involves being responsive to humans in pain and to animals in pain, 
and being a partner for weary humans and weary animals. God “will 
be with them,” all of them. The challenge for Moses is to emulate 
the divine ideal and to “be with each and every one of them” as well.
One way in which Moses might meet that challenge is by 
legislating that it is forbidden to cause unnecessary pain to any 
sentient creature whatsoever. Various rabbinic texts suggest this 
possibility, as they indicate that Moses recorded a prohibition of 
tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim, the suffering of animals, in the written Torah.13 
This prohibition has generally been understood by Jewish legal 
authorities as a prohibition of causing unnecessary suffering; and it 
has sometimes been understood as applying to both animals and to 
humans: it is forbidden to cause unnecessary suffering to animals, 
and all the more so to human beings.14 The prohibition, understood 
in this way, demands compassion for animals and humans at the 
same time. Such legislation would have first been issued at Mount 
Horeb, also known as Mount Sinai, at the very spot where Moses 
first encountered the intertwined needs of the animals and humans 
that simultaneously demanded his compassion.
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The Commanding Fire of Torah
The biblical narrative implies that Mount Horeb and Mount Sinai are 
the same location; a rabbinic midrash (Pirkei D’rabbi Eliezer) explains 
that the mountain was renamed Mount Sinai after Moses’ encounter 
with God at the bush, taking the name “Sinai” as a derivative of the 
Hebrew word s’neh, meaning “bush.”15 From the burning bush, God 
promises that “when you [in the singular, i.e. Moses] have freed the 
people from Egypt, you [in the plural, i.e., the nation] shall worship 
God at this mountain” (Exodus 3:12). And this promise is later 
fulfilled: after leading the people of Israel out of Egypt, Moses will 
bring the people back to this mountain. As I understand it, Moses 
will thus bring the people back to the spot where he had found his 
escaped kid and understood its suffering, where he had realized the 
need for compassion for all creatures, where he had encountered the 
ideal of compassion for the people of Israel in their slavery, and where 
he had felt the pain of Israel’s slavery as the pain of birds in a burning 
thorn bush.
But when Moses returns to the mountain after the exodus from 
Egypt, it will no longer be only a single bush that will be in flames; 
rather, the whole mountain will now be aflame. In the language 
of the Book of Deuteronomy, “the mountain was ablaze with fire” 
(Deuteronomy 4:11, 5:23, and 9:15), and the divine voice comes “from 
out of the fire” (Deuteronomy 4:12, 15, 33, 36 and 5:4, 19, 23). If we 
understand the fire of the bush to be a sign of the ideal of compassion 
in response to suffering, we may understand the fire that envelops 
the mountain as an even more powerful symbol of compassion for 
all creatures, a renewed manifestation of the ideal that Moses first 
encountered in the bush. Like that first fire, this fire also clearly 
demands, obligates, and commands; the divine voice that comes from 
it is the source of legislation, the “fiery law” (Deuteronomy 33:2) 
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placed upon all Israelites. God, the ideal of compassion, commands 
the people of Israel to strive toward that ideal, to obey the laws that 
will teach them and help them to grow deeper in compassion. The 
divine voice addresses each one of them and cannot be silenced; the 
divine ideal burns before the eyes of the entire people, threatening 
their complacency, setting forth a covenant of compassion that 
demands responsiveness to the suffering of others.
The idea that a demand for compassion lies at the heart of God’s 
revelation is expressed particularly well in the literature of the Musar 
movement. Rabbi Yeruḥam Halevi Levovitz of Mir (c. 1873–1936), 
for example, explains that “the preface to the giving of the Torah is 
the love of [God’s] creatures,” pointing to the love for others that 
prevailed among the people of Israel at the moment of revelation.16 
Rabbi Eliyahu Eliezer Dessler (1892–1953) explains the notion 
of “love of God’s creatures” as a matter of “recognizing that one is 
connected to all others, until one does not feel a sense of selfhood 
and what is ‘his’ at all, and thus one is unified with the rest of creation. 
And therefore Rabbi Akiva said that ‘love your fellow as yourself ’ 
(Leviticus 19:18) is the great principle of the Torah, for from one’s 
perspective there is the joining of all creation in complete unity” and 
“the affliction and disadvantage of one’s fellow is also truly one’s 
own.”17 Rabbi Simḥah Zissel Ziv of Kelm (1824–1898) explains 
that “love for God’s creatures” is the divine attribute that is most 
clearly revealed to us, which makes “closeness to the blessed Eternal 
One” possible; he concludes that “consequently we find that the 
prohibition of [causing] suffering to animals [tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim] 
comes from the Torah.”18
Building on Levovitz’s comment, we might imagine that what 
makes the mountain the spot for the revelation of Torah is the 
discovery by the whole people of Israel of some of the sense of concern 
for others that Moses found so deeply there. Building on Dessler’s 
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explanation, we can imagine the extent to which commandments for 
compassion toward others threaten the complacency of those who 
would rather ignore the suffering of others. On the other hand, we 
should recognize that “love of God’s creatures” in Levovitz’s and 
Dessler’s comments could be read narrowly, as referring only to human 
beings or perhaps only to members of one’s own people. Simḥah 
Zissel Ziv’s explicit connection between “love of God’s creatures” and 
the prohibition of causing suffering to animals may remind us not to 
understand commandments of compassion too narrowly.
As we consider this prohibition at the heart of the revelation to the 
people, we may imagine that this commandment was already known 
to Moses, at the time when he first encountered the kid that escaped 
from his flock at this very same spot. Elsewhere in his writings, 
Levovitz describes how Moses passed God’s test because with his 
concern even for the thirst and weariness of the kid, he showed that 
he would not ignore “even the slightest suffering of an animal.”19 This 
episode showed Moses’ concern to prevent any tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim, 
any suffering to animals: “Such care for the flock, such caution for 
the suffering to animals [tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim] in [even] this amount, 
is simply the force of his compassion in its fullness.”20 We might 
imagine that Moses’ compassion for all creatures, reflecting the ideal 
compassion seen in the burning bush, had allowed him to internalize 
the prohibition of causing suffering; as Moses’ people are now brought 
to the same spot, they are challenged to also abide by this prohibition, 
and to reflect the ideal compassion seen in the blazing mountain.
Sacrifice and the Limits to Compassion for Animals
But even if we imagine that this ideal of compassion was 
communicated to Moses and then to the rest of the people, we might 
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imagine that Moses—and certainly the rest of the people—struggled 
to emulate it. As noted above, Moses may well have had the instinct 
to turn away from the suffering that he had encountered at the 
burning bush, and he certainly had the instinct to resist God’s call 
to take responsibility for alleviating the suffering of his people. We 
might imagine that he also resisted the call to take responsibility for 
animals. Once he focused himself on the task of leading the people 
of Israel out of Egypt, he may have turned away from concerns with 
other creatures. Perhaps he could not bear to keep more suffering 
in mind, and perhaps he was overwhelmed by the ideal of concern 
for “each and every one” of God’s creatures. Perhaps he heard God’s 
assertion that “I will be with them” as referring only to Israel, and 
he rejected the idea that it could include suffering animals as well. 
Perhaps he did internalize the prohibition of causing unnecessary 
suffering and did teach it to his people, but became convinced that 
causing a considerable amount of suffering is necessary, especially 
given the necessity of animal sacrifice.
This last possibility is established in the unfolding narrative of the 
written Torah. After all, even at the burning bush, Moses does hear 
the divine voice command him to cause some suffering to animals—
namely, by sacrificing them to God. God instructs Moses that “when 
you have freed the people from Egypt, you shall worship God at this 
mountain” (Exodus 3:12), and the commandment to “worship,” in 
this context, indicates animal sacrifice. This is clarified a few verses 
later, when Moses is instructed to ask Pharaoh to “let us go a distance 
of three days into the wilderness to sacrifice to the Eternal our God” 
(Exodus 3:18).
When he returns to Egypt, Moses also hears God’s commandment 
for every Israelite household to slaughter a kid or a lamb, the blood 
of which will protect the people of Israel from death (Exodus 12:13). 
This is, surely, a commandment that Moses understands as necessary. 
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And when Moses brings the freed Israelites back to Mount Horeb, he 
also seals the covenant at the mountain with the blood of slaughtered 
animals. He “designated some young men among the Israelites, and 
they offered burnt offerings and sacrificed bulls as offerings of well-
being to the Eternal. Moses took one part of the blood and put it in 
basins, and the other part of the blood he dashed against the altar….
Moses took the blood [in the basins] and dashed it on the people 
and said, ‘This is the blood of the covenant that the Eternal One now 
makes with you concerning all these commands’” (Exodus 24:5–6, 8). 
This, too, evidently seemed necessary.
Why was that the case? Can we still imagine that this is a covenant 
of compassion, instituted by the prophet who “was understanding 
and discerning of the needs of every creature”? Why did Moses, who 
was filled with compassion for the tired and thirsty kid in Exodus 
3, show no apparent concern for the kids and lambs slaughtered in 
Exodus 12 or the bulls slaughtered in Exodus 24?
One possibility is that Moses was certain that God’s voice was 
commanding slaughter because he could not have imagined worship 
without slaughter, or least could not imagine the people of Israel 
tolerating God or Moses without feeling the security that sacrifice 
was sure to bring. Maimonides teaches that the people of Israel were 
accustomed to the idea that animal slaughter would bring benefit, 
and they could not have imagined anything different: “at that time 
the way of life generally accepted and customary in the whole world 
and the universal service upon which we were brought up consisted 
in offering various species of living beings.” They could not have 
been asked to give up the slaughter of animals altogether, since “man, 
according to his nature, is not capable of abandoning suddenly all to 
which he was accustomed.”21 The Torah did restrict animal slaughter 
in significant ways—allowing sacrifices only to God, and only in 
certain locations and with certain species—but it could not have 
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prohibited slaughter altogether.22
Historian of religions Aaron Gross suggests further reasons why 
animal slaughter may be viewed as necessary, even for a prophet 
distinguished by his compassion. Gross has pointed to the insight 
of the philosopher Jacques Derrida that sacrifice and other acts of 
violence against animals authorize that violence “in the name of 
protecting the human,” ensuring that we think of humans (or, at least, 
certain humans—not, say, the Egyptian firstborns in Exodus 12) as 
ultimately valuable in contrast to animals. Humans can be defined 
precisely as those who are not slaughtered, but rather as those whose 
desires, livelihoods, and rights are protected (with compassion), 
thanks to the sacrifice of animals.23 “The very concepts of ‘human’ 
and ‘animal,’” Gross writes, “are forged in a sacrificial fire.”24
In light of this insight, we might imagine that Moses did find 
assurance that God “will be with them”—with the people of Israel, 
those whom he saw as most human, and certainly not with sacrificial 
animals. If in Exodus 3 Mount Horeb was the location where 
compassion was demanded for both humans and animals, in Exodus 
24 Mount Horeb becomes the location where humans and animals 
are now wholly distinguished from each other. Animals are those 
whose throats should be slit, not only to feed human beings but 
also to offer them protection and atonement; humans are those who 
find atonement precisely when they have the blood of slaughtered 
animals dashed upon them by Moses, in line with the rabbinic 
teaching that “there is no atonement except with blood.”25 Amidst 
this scene, it is hard to imagine the fire on the mountain as a symbol 
of compassion for all creatures; any fires of compassions are eclipsed 
by the sacrificial fire designed to roast animal flesh and to enact the 
stark human/animal dichotomy.
To deny the suffering of the slaughtered animals and to repress 
compassion will be difficult for Moses. “No one,” Derrida has 
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written, “can deny the suffering, fear or panic, the terror or fright that 
can seize certain animals and that we humans can witness”—that 
“they suffer, like us.” Nor is there doubt “of there being within us the 
possibility of giving vent to a surge of compassion, even if it is then 
misunderstood, repressed, or denied, held at bay.”26 But, nevertheless, 
human beings will do what they can to avoid the suffering animal 
eyes that demand compassion and that will necessarily threaten the 
human/animal dichotomy. Compassion for an animal might well 
lead to the outcome that Rabbi Eliyahu Eliezer Dessler described, 
where one will “not feel a sense of selfhood and what is ‘his’ at all, and 
thus one is unified with the rest of creation,” and where the other’s 
affliction will feel like one’s own.27
After his encounter with the kid and with the divine ideal of 
compassion, Moses might have been in danger of losing his sense 
of self as an independent, human subject. He may now turn away 
from the memory of the gaze of the particular animal, and instead 
turn to giving instructions about how to relate to “the animal” in 
general. Yes, one should not be needlessly cruel to an animal, but one 
may kill when necessary—to satisfy cravings, to seal a covenant, to 
accommodate the “generally accepted and customary” way of life, or 
to protect human identity as distinct from the identity of the animal. 
As Gross writes, building on Derrida, “The generality of ‘the animal,’ 
insinuated in language, works silently to disavow impulses of pity 
and the often spontaneous tendency to place human and nonhuman 
animals in the same or proximate categories.”28 If Moses had at 
first felt compelled to emulate a divine compassion that promised 
“I will be with them” to all suffering creatures, he may now come to 
disavow that understanding, and to assure his people that the ideal 
of compassion would shine above all on them rather than on lesser 
beings.
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Recovering the Prohibition of Tza∙ar Ba∙alei Ḥayyim
It is striking that the prohibition of tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim is not even 
recorded explicitly in the written Torah of Moses. Still, as noted 
above, later rabbinic sources do indeed claim that the prohibition 
was in fact found in the Written Torah. Some sources depict Moses 
as receiving the commandment forty years after he had first brought 
the Israelites to Mount Horeb. If we imagine that Moses first felt the 
prohibition against tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim when he encountered the 
tired and thirsty kid at Horeb (as Yeruḥam Levovitz had suggested) 
but then came to disavow it (as I imagined in the previous section), 
we might imagine that, forty years later, approaching the end of his 
life, he recovered and taught the prohibition to the people of Israel.
One suggestive tradition appears in the writings of Rabbi Moses 
ibn Ḥabib, which indicate that the prohibition of tza∙ar ba∙alei 
ḥayyim is given in chapter 20 of the Book of Numbers. At this 
point, forty years after the exodus and the revelation at Horeb, the 
Israelites and their animals are tired and thirsty, and God commands 
Moses to use his rod to “provide water for the congregation and 
their animals” (Numbers 20:8).29 The inclusion of the animals in the 
commandment, for ibn Ḥabib, points to a commandment to prevent 
tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim.30 As we might explain, divine compassion seeks 
to alleviate the suffering not just of the Israelites but also of their 
flocks. We might imagine this instruction returning Moses to the 
moment where he first felt the force of compassion in its fullness and 
the commandment to prevent the suffering of animals; perhaps now, 
at last, Moses is able to hear that commandment clearly, applied to 
all of the animals in his care, and to record the commandment in the 
written Torah.
Still another tradition sees the prohibition of tza∙ar ba∙aalei 
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ḥayyim as recorded in the Written Torah two chapters later, in the 
story of the non-Israelite prophet Balaam. Balaam is riding on his 
donkey, heading to curse the people of Israel, when God prevents the 
donkey from moving forward, and Balaam beats her three times. The 
donkey objects, miraculously speaking to her master, and Balaam (not 
seeing the angel that prevents the donkey’s passage) only threatens 
her further: “If I had a sword with me, I’d kill you!” (Numbers 22:29). 
God then chastises Balaam, questioning him through the angel: “Why 
have you beaten your donkey these three times?” (Numbers 22:32). 
As recorded in one midrash (Midrash Ha-Gadol in the name of 
Rabbi Yoḥanan), this chastisement is what institutes the prohibition 
of tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim.31 When Moses records this story in the 
Torah, and writes down the divine response to Balaam, he instructs 
the Israelites that causing unnecessary suffering is prohibited.
On the one hand, Balaam is far less able than Moses to sense God’s 
compassion for all creatures. Whereas Moses perceives God’s angel at 
the burning bush at the moment that he responds compassionately 
to the escaped kid, Balaam fails to perceive God’s angel before him 
while he cruelly beats his donkey. Whereas Moses uses his rod to 
draw water for animals, Balaam only uses his rod to beat an animal. 
And while Balaam mistreats his donkey, Moses is also described by 
the Torah as a donkey rider and does not mistreat his donkey. Moses 
is described as getting on a donkey to head to Egypt with his wife 
and sons immediately following the burning bush episode (Exodus 
4:20), and midrashic tradition notes that Moses’ donkey was in fact 
the child of the donkey that Balaam rode.32 We can imagine that 
Moses would treat well the foal of the animal that Balaam abused.
But Balaam may come to significantly improve his ways. Balaam 
is sometimes described in midrashic literature as Moses’ alter ego, 
“like Moses” and in some respects even superior to Moses. The Book 
of Deuteronomy teaches that “never again did there arise in Israel 
259         “I Will Be with Them”
a prophet like Moses—whom the Eternal singled out, face to face” 
(Deuteronomy 34:10),33 and Sifrei Devarim protests: “None has 
arisen in Israel, but one has arisen among the nations. And who 
was he? Balaam son of Beor. Yet there is a difference between the 
prophecy of Moses and that of Balaam: Moses did not know who 
was speaking to him [out of the burning bush], whereas Balaam did 
know who was speaking to him.”34 Whereas Moses is baffled at the 
burning bush, and perhaps especially confused by the revelation of 
God’s enigmatic name, Balaam does not seem to have any confusion 
when he is addressed by God, and perhaps he responds as well as 
Moses—or with even greater compassion. And he seems contrite 
when God chastises him and teaches him the prohibition of tza∙ar 
ba∙alei ḥayyim; “I have sinned,” he says (Numbers 22:34).
But then, perhaps, Moses learns from hearing of (and writing 
down the story of ) Balaam’s contrition. Moses might benefit from 
noticing how God defends the donkey—“I will be with her in her 
suffering,” God might seem to say. Balaam may ultimately end up 
resisting the call of compassion just as Moses did (he, too, sacrifices 
animals after this encounter with God), while we can still imagine 
Moses’ hearing of this episode as changing him. If he had resisted 
recording and teaching the prohibition of tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim until 
this point, we can imagine him as now finally inscribing it in the 
Torah. Whether with hearing the command to give water to his 
flocks, or with hearing of the commandment to Balaam not to strike 
his donkey, we can imagine Moses turning back toward the ideal of 
divine compassion toward the end of his life.
Conclusions
In this essay, I have imagined the life of Moses as following an arc in 
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relationship to the divine ideal of compassion for all sentient beings. 
As I have imagined it, Moses first comes close to the divine ideal 
of compassion for all creatures and grasps the commanding power 
of that ideal—an ideal that finds expression in the revelation of the 
suffering kid, the revelation of the burning bush, and in the revelation 
of the divine name, Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh. When they return to the 
spot where these revelations occurred, the Israelites whom Moses 
leads are confronted with this ideal of compassion as well. Moses 
may come to disavow this understanding and his vision of preventing 
animal suffering, when he focuses on his people and the necessity 
of animal sacrifice. But he may later come to recover some of the 
power of his original encounter and to turn back toward the ideal of 
divine compassion later in life, when he is finally able to record the 
prohibition of tza∙ar ba∙alei ḥayyim in the Torah.
As I conceive of God, God is a commanding ideal of moral 
goodness, and at the heart of moral goodness is compassion for other 
beings. Traces of the divine presence may be glimpsed through acts 
of compassion for those who suffer, including those animals whose 
suffering is most easily ignored. All of us, I think, can apprehend the 
obligations that God imposes upon us when we, like Moses, act with 
compassion. And all of us can easily turn away from these obligations, 
especially when they threaten our complacency, our self-centered 
desires, or our sense of human identity. All of us can be like Moses as 
he lifts a tired animal on his shoulder and turns toward the ideal of 
compassion that burns before his eyes, and all of us can also be like 
Moses as he burns the bodies of sacrificial animals and as he takes up 
their blood. We may be moved by the rabbinic idea that atonement is 
achieved through lovingkindness,35 but we may also be moved by the 
idea that there is no atonement except with blood.36
Precisely because most of us turn away from seeing the suffering 
of animals, I see particular value in the model of Moses turning 
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toward the kid, turning toward the bush and the vision of trapped 
birds, and turning to hear the divine name that speaks of all who 
suffer. Especially in the contemporary era, where animals are abused 
and slaughtered on an unprecedented scale—where billions of 
birds, for example, are raised for human consumption in tortuous 
conditions that resemble those that Moses saw within the burning 
bush—the model of responsiveness that Moses offers may help us to 
consider ways to increase our own responsiveness to mass suffering. 
Especially in an era where it is very easy to turn one’s eyes away 
from the mass suffering of animals—so much of animal suffering 
takes place in factory farms, behind closed doors—Moses’ initial 
refusal to turn away may help to remind us not to turn away. And 
considering how Moses may then disavow the animal as he develops 
systems of sacrifice can help us to see how we also disavow animals 
in supporting our contemporary systems of abuse and slaughter.37
It is difficult to be with others who are suffering and even harder 
to feel their pain, and it is all the more difficult to be compassionate 
when the number of those who suffer is so staggering. We will 
inevitably fall short of the ideal of compassion, and yet it is my hope 
that the ideal is one toward which we can take steps, as best we are 
able. May God conceived of as an ideal of “being with them,” Ehyeh 
Asher Ehyeh, be a source of inspiration for our own growth toward 
ever-deepening compassion.
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